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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
vs. 
NORM SMITH, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 20030241-SC 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to the provisions 
of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(a). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the concealed weapons charge 
be dismissed but incorrectly remanded for a new trial thus violating the tenets of double 
jeopardy? In the court of appeals5 this issue was reviewed under an ineffective 
assistance of counsel standard, however, it appears to present this Court with a question 
of law that is reviewed for correctness. See, State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 549-
550 (Utah 1996). 
2. Whether the Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded that aggravated assault is not a 
lesser included offense that merges into second degree felony use of a concealed 
weapon? This issue presents this Court with an issue of statutory construction that is 
reviewed for correctness with no particular deference afforded to the ruling. State v. 
Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995). This issue was preserved in a pre-trial 
motion (Trial Tr. at 212-218). 
"On certiorari review, 'we review the court of appeals' decision, not the opinion of 
the [trial] court.' State v. Weeks, 61 P.3d 1000 (Utah 2002). That decision is then 
reviewed for correctness." State v. Leatherbury, 2003 UT 2, \ 7, 65 P.3d 1180. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All relevant statulory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The court of appeals affirmed Norm Smith's conviction for aggravated assault and 
resisting lawful arrest, but reversed Smith's conviction for carrying a concealed weapon 
and remanded the matter for a new trial on that charge. State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, 
65 P.3d 648. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Norm Smith was charge with and bound over for trial for carrying a concealed 
weapon, two counts of aggravated assault, and interfering with a peace officer making a 
lawful arrest (R. 1-2, 16-17, 20-21, 26-27; Smith, 2003 UT App 52, at f7). Smith filed a 
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motion to suppress evidence and dismiss the case, including many other motions over the 
course of two and a half years, most of which were denied (R. 12-678, 328-39, 589). 
Following a five day jury trial, a jury convicted Smith of all four counts as charged 
(R. 724-25; 933: 11156-57; Smith, 2003 UT App 52, at JI). Smith moved for a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial (R. 727-30, 745-47, 751-73). Those 
motions were denied (R. 779-80). Smith was sentenced to one-to-fifteen years in prison 
for carrying a concealed weapon, zero-to-five years in prison for each aggravated assault 
conviction, and six months in jail for interfering with a lawful arrest (R. 829-31; Smith, 
2003 UT App 52 at [^7). The court suspended the sentence and placed Smith on 
supervised probation for 36 months, subject to a jail commitment of 60 days, the payment 
of $2000, and various other conditions (R. 831-33; Smith, 2003 UT App 52 at f 0 - The 
trial court has since terminated his supervised probation (R. 920). 
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed Smith's conviction for aggravated assault 
and resisting lawful arrest, but reversed his conviction for carrying a concealed weapon 
and remanded the matter for a new trial on that charge. Smith, 2003 UT App 52 at Tf37. 
This Court granted the State's petition for certiorari and part of Smith's petition for 
certiorari on August 21, 2003. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Testimony of Officer Johnny Owen 
Johnny Owen a deputy with the Washington County Sheriffs Office testified that 
on April 9, 1996, he was dispatched to 561 North Kolob Road in Virgin, Utah, at 
approximately 4:00 p.m. on a report that a man was throwing rocks and brandishing a 
weapon (Trial Tr. at 271-73, 280).1 Deputy Orvin responded to the same scene in a 
separate vehicle (Trial Tr. at 273, 275). When the officers arrived, Owen noticed a 
vehicle with a person standing nearby (Call) and Smith a little farther ahead on the 
property (Trial Tr. at 275). Owen first contacted Call, asked about weapons (Trial Tr. at 
278). Owen testified that he started to speak with Smith who started to come towards 
Call's vehicle (Trial Tr. at 279-280). 
Owen testified that he told Smith that they were there to investigate a report that 
he had been throwing rocks and brandishing a weapon (Trial Tr. at 281). Owen asked if 
Smith had a weapon and Smith lifted his shirt and exposed a pistol in a holster on his 
right side (Trial Tr. at 281). Owen testified that the weapon was not intentionally 
concealed but was concealed because the shirt was worn outside of the pants (Trial Tr. at 
468). 
According to Owen, Smith then put his hand on the butt of the gun (Trial Tr. at 
282). Owen said that he asked for the gun for safety reasons while they investigated the 
dispatched information (Trial Tr. at 282). Smith told Owen that every time "we showed 
up he'd get arrested and he wasn't giving his gun up" (Trial Tr. at 283). Owen continued 
to ask for the gun and moved closer to Smith (Trial Tr. at 283). Owen testified that he 
"kept asking [Smith] to remove his hand from the butt of the gun" and that he "didn't 
want [Smith] to draw the weapon" because "[he] didn't want to have to shoot [Smith] and 
lOwen testified that he saw no one brandish a weapon when he arrived at the 
scene (Trial Tr. at 384). 
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[he] didn't want to be shot" (Trial Tr. at 323). In response, Smith backed away (Trial Tr. 
at 283). According to Owen, Smith was agitated and upset (Trial Tr. at 284). Owen 
also testified that he was the only one speaking with Smith and that Orvin was behind 
him and he did not know what Orvin was doing or if he ever drew his weapon (Trial Tr. 
at 407). 
When Smith got close to a partially-built octagon-shaped building on the property, 
he took "off to his left and [went] through the windows of the building" (Trial Tr. at 285, 
303).2 Owen then approached the building keeping Smith in his sight through another 
window frame (Trial Tr. at 305, 308, 416). Orvin then approached the building from the 
opposite side approximately six feet away with his gun out (Trial Tr. at 308, 312, 423). 
Smith went behind a barrel in the building (Trial Tr. at 309). Owen testified that he 
continued to speak with Smith and ask him for the weapon (Trial Tr. at 309). At this 
point Owen still did not perceive much of a threat from Smith (Trial Tr. at 424). 
According to Owen at some point in the exchange, Smith "made the comment that he 
could, he could shoot us" (Trial Tr. at 309). Owen responded that "he might shoot one of 
us but the other one would shoot, the other one would shoot him before he could get both 
of us" (Trial Tr. at 309). Owen testified that Smith then "drew his weapon" at what 
seemed to be an angle towards Orvin, who then pointed his weapon at Smith (Trial Tr. at 
310, 430). Smith then crouched down behind the barrel (Trial Tr. at 310). 
There was also a trailer on the property and another brownish-red structure that 
had a gray roof (Trial Tr. at 334). 
Owen testified that at this point "we remained there for a few minutes still trying 
to talk [Smith] out of the weapon. Our weapons, we actually started... Well, I actually 
started pulling the trigger to fire. And then I kind of noticed that [Smith] relaxed a little 
bit. I relaxed my finger. I proceeded and moved to the area of the door in the building 
and took another aim from that angle which I had a whole body angle of [Smith's] whole 
body at that time" (Trial Tr. at 313-14). Smith was again asked to lower his gun and he 
obeyed and laid it on top of the barrel (Trial Tr. at 314). Smith, on command, then placed 
his hands on his head and walked over to Owen (Trial Tr. at 315). Orvin then entered the 
building and placed Smith in handcuffs (Trial Tr. at 315). 
After Smith was placed in Owen's patrol car, Owen went back to the building and 
recovered the gun (Trial Tr. at 320). Owen testified that he also located to other guns—a 
shotgun and a rifle—behind and to the left from where Smith had been crouching in the 
building (Trial Tr. at 320-21). Owen also found shells in the same location (Trial Tr. at 
321), 
B. Testimony of Lorin Orvin 
Lorin Orvin testified that on April 9, 1996, he was employed as a deputy in the 
Washington County Sheriffs Office and that he responded to a dispatched call with 
Officer Owen in Virgin, Utah, on a report of brandishing a weapon (Trial Tr. at 499-500, 
509). At the location, Orvin testified that he encountered a vehicle and two male 
subjects-Norm Smith and Clayton Call (Trial Tr. at 503). Orvin asked Call if he had any 
weapons (Trial Tr. at 594). Orvin testified that his role was to provide back-up for Owen 
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and that he stayed behind Owen to oversee issues of officer safety while Owen 
approached and spoke with Smith (Trial Tr. at 506, 519). 
Orvin heard Owen ask Smith about a gun and saw Smith lift his shirt to expose a 
holstered gun that sat on his hip (Trial Tr. at 520-21, 581,). Orvin then saw Smith put 
his hand on the butt of the gun (Trial Tr. at 522, 597). Orvin said he then pulled out his 
gun and put it behind his leg in order to have it concealed yet readily available (Trial Tr. 
at 522, 523, 591-92). Contemporaneous to this action by Orvin, conversation continued 
between Owen and Smith about putting away the gun and as Owen moved towards him, 
Smith retreated (Trial Tr. at 523, 525, 593). Smith then turned around and quickly 
entered the octagon-shaped building through one of the window frames (Trial Tr. at 525). 
Owen and then Orvin approached the building from opposite sides and Orvin saw Smith 
behind some material in the back of the building (Trial Tr. at 526-27). Orvin testified 
that at some point during the encounter, Smith said "something about his constitutional 
rights or some civil rights, and something to the effect that all you son-of-a-bitches 
should be dead" (Trial Tr. at 530). Orvin also testified that he remembered "something 
to the effect of what if I pull the gun, what are you going to do, shoot me? And I 
remember making, and that's when I made a statement, I said, if you do pull the gun then 
you will be shot" (Trial Tr. at 531). 
Orvin testified that Smith then dropped to his knees and pointed the gun straight at 
him (Trial Tr. at 531). Orvin then fell to the dirt below the concrete and radioed for help 
(Trial Tr. at 531). Orvin then came up the side of the building to maintain cover and 
pointed his gun towards Smith and told Smith to drop his gun (Trial Tr. at 532). Orvin 
heard Owen again communicate to Smith to put the gun down and Smith obeyed (Trial 
Tr. at 532-33). Smith, at Owen's command, then placed his hands on his head and 
walked towards him (Trial Tr. at 533). 
After Smith had been taken to the jail, Smith told Orvin "you could have shot me, 
thanks for not shooting me" (Trial Tr. at 545). 
C. Testimony of Sharon Felton 
Sharon Felton testified that on the afternoon of April 9, 1996, she observed Smith 
on the property next to hers and that he was agitated and walking up and down the 
property with a gun in a holster at times and in his hand at other times (Trial Tr. at 1064-
65, 1084, 1097). Felton testified that during the afternoon, Smith through a couple of dirt 
clods at her house (Trial Tr. at 1065). In the 911 tape, Felton indicated that rocks had 
been thrown (Trial Tr. at 1079). Felton also testified that Smith's shirttail was not tucked 
in and that she had seen him untuck it and pull it over the gun he was wearing; and that 
this occurred a few minutes before the officers arrived at the property (Trial Tr. at 1066-
68). Felton testified that earlier in the afternoon she heard Smith say to her husband, Ron 
Felton, and to Mr. Anderson that the "only good cop is a dead cop" (Trial Tr. at 1068, 
1076). Felton testified that she was the one who called dispatch (Trial Tr. at 1069). 
Felton also testified that after the officers arrived and asked Smith about a weapon that 
Smith informed the officer that he did not have a concealed weapon (Trial Tr. at 1095). 
D. Testimony of Clayton Call 
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Clayton Call testified that he was with Smith at a piece of property in Virgin, 
Utah, on April 9, 1996 (Trial Tr. at 713). Call and Smith had traveled to the properly 
together from Rockville (Trial Tr. at 713). The purpose of the visit was to feed the 
horses and expect the property (Trial Tr. at 713-14). When they arrived at the property, 
Smith noticed that some of his property was missing and that some vandalism had 
occurred (Trial Tr. at 714). 
Call and Smith then traveled to Coal Pits Mountain to look for the missing 
property (Trial Tr. at 715). After a problem with Call's motorcycle, the two returned to 
the property in Call's automobile (Trial Tr. at 715-16). Call then left the property and 
went to the Bull Cinch Bar where he called Smith's wife, Donna, at the Dream Catcher 
Inn in Rockville (Trial Tr. at 717-18). Donna said that she would call the police (Trial 
Tr. at 718). As a result of this phone call, Call testified that he expected the police to 
arrive at the property (Trial Tr. at 719). When the police still had not arrived a few hours 
later, Call again called Donna at the bed and breakfast (Trial Tr. at 720). During the 
afternoon, Call and Smith discussed their fears for the safety of the animals at the 
property if they were left unattended (Trial Tr. at 721). 
Call started to leave the property when he noticed the police coming up the hill so 
he immediately reversed his car and went back up to the property (Trial Tr. at 722). Call 
got out of his vehicle and he and Smith watched the officers approach by the vehicle 
(Trial Tr. at 725). 
When the officers left their vehicles and approached, Owen asked Smith if he was 
carrying a weapon and Smith responded affirmatively and turned so that the firearm 
could be seen around the back where his shirt was tucked in (Trial Tr. at 726-27). Call 
testified that Owen and Orvin gave different commands (Trial Tr. at 728). Call testified 
that Owen told Smith to remove the pistol and lay it down but that when Smith started to 
respond and touched the weapon, Orvin would tell him to not to touch the gun (Trial Tr. 
at 729). Call testified that he found the commands confusing but that he told Smith to let 
the officers have the gun (Trial Tr. at 730, 766). In a statement written after the incident, 
Call indicated that Smith was angry and reluctant to surrender the gun "because other 
police had guns drawn" (Trial Tr. at 768). 
After Smith retreated into the building through the window frame, Call was told 
by the officers to put his hands on the vehicle before both officers proceeded to the 
building (Trial Tr. at 730-31, 733). Call testified that he could hear from the police radio 
through one of the patrol cars' open window that there was another officer enroute (Trial 
Tr. at 733). Call testified that Orvin drew his weapon before Owen (Trial Tr. at 734). 
Call tried to converse with the officers but was told to keep quiet (Trial Tr. at 735). In his 
written statement, Call indicated that while Smith was in the building he tried to get him 
to put the weapon away but that Smith "said every time there were reports written out 
they only got lost and nothing ever happened, nothing, well, nothing ever got done. 
[Smith], I guess, pulled his, pulled his gun" (Trial Tr. at 773). While Smith was inside 
the building and the officers were on the outside, one of the officers—probably Orvin— 
"ran around to the door, and as he ran... [Call] could hear him whisper to himself, we 
ought to shoot him right hear and now and be over with it" (Trial Tr. at 739). Once 
the officers entered the building, Call testified that he heard "a lot of commotion going on 
in there" and that it "[sjounded like a lot of things were being thrown around in there and 
somebody being bodyslammed" against the wall as the "whole structure shook" (Trial Tr. 
at 742). 
Call testified that Smith had been carrying a gun on the property because "[h]e had 
been threatened and he was anticipating possibly another problem going on with some 
more vandalism" (Trial Tr. at 761). 
E. Testimony of Henry Babcock 
Henry Babcock testified that he has been an acquaintance of Smith for 4-5 years 
(Trial Tr. at 780). Babcock testified that he recalled the April 9, 1996, incident because 
his property is directly to the south of Smith's property (Trial Tr. at 780-81). Babcock 
indicated that the officer arrived at approximately 4:00 p.m. (Trial Tr. at 781). Babcock 
first observed Smith that day about noon (Trial Tr. at 781). Smith left the property and 
then returned at approximately 1:00 p.m. (Trial Tr. at 781). When Smith returned 
Babcock noticed that he was wearing a holster on his right side that contained a pistol 
(Trial Tr. at 782). Babcock testified that he believed that Smith's shirt was tucked in 
because the holster was very obvious (Trial Tr. at 782). Call and Smith removed two 
rifles from a bunker in the property and took them into the octagon-shaped building 
where they sat in two chairs and talked (Trial Tr. at 783-84). 
When the officers arrived they approached Smith and "he seemed to back up away 
from them and went around another car, and proceeded to go ahead and get into a, this, 
jump through a partially open window, or a window of the partially built building there" 
(Trial Tr. at 785-86). Babcock couldn't see what transpired in the building but he heard 
voices and heard the officers say "Norm, lay them down, lay it down, or something like 
that" (Trial Tr. at 786). Babcock testified that he heard two officer's voices (Trial Tr. at 
786). Babcock testified that he saw the officers draw their guns after Smith was in the 
building (Trial Tr. at 788). 
Babcock also testified that at the time of the officers' arrival, he could not say for 
sure whether Smith's shirt was tucked in or out (Trial Tr. at 789). 
F. Testimony of Norm Smith 
Norm Smith testified that on April 9, 1996, he was at the property in Virgin when 
he had the encounter with the two sheriff deputies involving weapons. (Trial Tr. at 958). 
Smith, explaining why he had a firearm on his person, testified that "my wife and two 
daughters had been threatened by Mr. Seach, and the horses on the property had been 
threatened to be killed, and so we felt that we had two areas that we needed to be 
concerned with that particular night especially in light of the vandalism, destruction and 
theft that had occurred on the property that day." (Trial Tr. at 871). 
Smith testified that when he saw the two officers, he perceived that the officers 
were responding to a complaint his wife made earlier that day concerning the vandalism 
and that the officers "were coming to help me." (Trial Tr. at 874). Smith testified that 
when the officers came to his property on April 9, 1996, he was carrying a firearm on his 
hip. (Trial Tr. at 875). Smith testified that his shirt was tucked in when the officers came 
so his gun was not concealed. (Trial Tr. at 954, 875). 
Smith testified that Officer Owen asked if anyone had a firearm. (Trial Tr. at 875). 
Smith testified that he turned sideways so Officer Owen could see the firearm, and said 
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"it's right here." (Trial Tr. at 875). Smith further testified that Officer Owen then 
commanded him to "lay down the firearm." Smith testified that he attempted to comply 
with Officer Owen's command and reached for the firearm "to pull it out and to lay it 
down like he said." Smith also testified that as he did this, Officer Orvin, who was 
standing thirty-five to forty-five feet away, began to draw for his gun. (Trial Tr. at 876, 
877). Smith asserts that the action by Officer Orvin, drawing for his gun, was a distinct 
and different command than the oral command given by Officer Owen. (Trial Tr. at 
1140). 
Smith testified that at this point, he was afraid to touch the firearm. (Trial Tr. at 
890.) He then retreated and jumped through the window of the structure. (Trial Tr. at 
878). Smith testified that he asked the cops if they had a warrant and if not they were 
trespassing and should leave his property. (Trial Tr. at 878). Smith also testified that he 
did not point his weapon at the officers. (Trial Tr. at 924, 982). Smith testified that he 
laid the firearm down. (Trial Tr. at 898). Smith was then cuffed and taken to the police 
car. (Trial Tr. at 916). 
Smith testified that when he was cuffed, the Officer Orvin patted him down and 
removed two bullets from Smith's pockets. (Trial Tr. at 917). Smith testified that his 
firearm was not loaded during his confrontation with the two officers. (Trial Tr. at 914-
915). On cross examination, the prosecutor's first line of questioning attempted to 
establish Smith's residence during April 9, 1996, to be at the Dream Catcher Inn. (Trial 
Tr. at 955-957). Smith claimed that during that time, he resided at the Dream Catcher Inn 
and at his place of property in Virgin. (Trial Tr. at 956). The prosecutor's second line of 
questioning dealt with Smith's confrontation with the deputies and his handling of the 
firearm. (Trial Tr. at 958-961). The prosecutor asked Smith the following: 
Filter: By the way, do you have a concealed weapons permit? 
Smith: No, I do not. 
Filter: Have you ever had one? 
Smith: No, I have not. 
(Trial Tr. at 961). On redirect, Smith testified that the officers never asked him whether 
or not he had a weapons permit. (Trial Tr. at 977). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Smith asserts that the court of appeals erred by holding that aggravated assault is 
not a lesser included offense that merges with second degree felony use of a concealed 
weapon because this is an "enhancement statute." The plain language of Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-1-402(3) and § 76-10-504 demonstrate that under the facts of this case, 
aggravated assault is a lesser included offense to use of a concealed weapon requiring 
merger of the two offenses. 
The court of appeals correctly determined that Smith's trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to move for a directed verdict when the State presented no evidence 
that Smith did not possess a valid firearm permit. However, the court of appeals erred in 
remanding this case for a new trial because the evidence was insufficient to support the 
conviction. Because the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction, a new trial 
violates double jeopardy. 
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ARGUMENT 
L THE COURT OF APPEALS INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT IN NOT A LESSER INCLUDED 
OFFENSE OF SECOND DEGREE FELONY USE OF A 
CONCEALED WEAPON 
Smith was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault, third degree felonies, in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-103 and one count of possession of a concealed 
weapon, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-504(3). 
Smith asserts that under the facts of this case, his two counts of aggravated assault is a 
lesser included offense that merges with second degree use of a concealed weapon. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse these two convictions because they merge with 
the use of a concealed weapon charge. 
The merger doctrine has been codified at Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-402(3) and 
provides: 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged 
but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An 
offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation 
to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
The court of appeals acknowledged that "third degree aggravated assault was 
'established by proof of the same or less than all of the facts required to establish' the 
second degree weapons offense," and that "pursuant to a traditional merger analyses, the 
underlying aggravated assault charges should merge into the second degree felony" 
weapons charge. Smith, 2003 UT App 52 at [^20 (quoting Utah Code Annotated §76-1-
402(3)(a)). However, the court of appeals then asserted that Utah Code Annotated § 76-
10-504(3) is an enhancement statute and "the legislature did not intend merger to apply." 
Id. at 122. 
Smith asserts that the court's reliance on State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234 (Utah 
1990), is misplaced and that the plain language of §§ 76-1-402 and 76-10-504 demands 
that aggravated assault merge with second degree felony use of a concealed weapon. 
In McCovey this Court considered whether aggravated robbery was a lesser 
included offense that would merge into second degree murder. This Court prior to 
McCovey had previously concluded in State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986), that 
aggravated robbery merged into first degree murder where the aggravated circumstance is 
aggravated robbery because "no additional facts or separate elements are required to 
prove aggravated robbery after first degree murder" and because "first degree murder 
based on the predicate offense of aggravated robbery stands in a greater relationship to 
the lesser included offense of aggravated robbery." McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1237-38 
(quoting Shaffer, 725 P.2d at 1313-14). 
In reaching its decision in McCovey, this Court stated, "the only reason aggravated 
robbery is encompassed within the definition of lesser included offense of felony murder 
is that the legislature designated it as an enhancing offense. Aggravated robbery does 
not, by its nature, have overlapping elements with any traditional form of murder." Id. 
This Court stated that the main reason behind felony murder doctrine "has been to allow 
the State to obtain a second degree murder conviction without proving any form of mens 
rea.... In essence, it is a strict liability offense that enhances an otherwise unintentional 
killing to second degree murder." Id. at 1238. The Court further explained "if the 
legislature intended to make the underlying felony [aggravated robbery] a lesser included 
offense, then a felon could receive a two-for-one windfall by convincing the jury that the 
homicide was unintentional or accidental." Id. The Court concluded that the Utah 
Legislature intended that the multiple crimes of felony murder and aggravated robbery 
are to be punished as separate crimes. Id. at 1239. This Court did not overrule Shaffer, 
but instead chose to allow legislative intent to decide the outcome. Thus, the real reason 
behind the Court finding aggravated robbery not to be a lesser included offense in second 
degree felony murder statutes was the interest in convicting people for killing others 
during the commission of a felony so that the defendant cannot claim that the killing was 
accidental. 
The same year that McCovey was decided, the Utah Court of Appeals decided 
State v. Kinsey, 797 P.2d 424 (Utah App. 1990). In Kinsey, the defendant attempted to 
steal $29.98 worth of merchandise at gunpoint, and was convicted of second degree 
felony retail theft. 797 P.2d at 426. The defendant appealed his conviction claiming his 
two convictions involved one act and the charges should have been merged under a lesser 
included offense. Id. at 429. The Court of Appeals was left to decide whether the 
defendant could have committed retail theft, enhanced to a second degree felony when 
"the actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft" without the defendant 
committing the crime of carrying a concealed dangerous weapon. Id. The Court found 
that the defendant could not be convicted of both charges, holding "where two crimes are 
in 
such that the greater cannot be committed without necessarily having committed the 
lesser, the defendant cannot be convicted or punished for both." Id. at 430. The theft 
charge was enhanced only because the defendant used a concealed weapon in the course 
of the theft. 
Similarly, in the present case, Smith was convicted of three separate charges 
arising out of the same alleged act. In order for Smith to be guilty of carrying a 
concealed weapon in commission of a crime of violence, he had to also be guilty of 
aggravated assault under the facts of this case. The alleged crime of violence that Smith 
committed was an aggravated assault on the police officers because of Smith's alleged 
use of a firearm. Under the facts of this case, it is clear that aggravated assault is a lesser 
included offense of the second degree felony carrying a concealed weapon. It is also 
clear that like in Shaffer, "no additional facts or separate elements are required" to prove 
aggravated assault after the elements of the second-degree concealed weapon are shown. 
Smith asserts that McCovey is not relevant to the facts of this case. McCovey was 
concerned with second degree felony murder and the State's substantial interest in 
holding people strictly liable for homicide committed during a felony, even when the 
killing was not intended. The facts and interests in the case at bar are more akin to 
Shaffer and alternatively to Kinsey, where the court of appeals actually considered the 
relevant issue and charge of carrying concealed dangerous weapon. 
That aggravated assault under the facts of this case is a lesser included offense of 
second degree felony use of a concealed weapon is obvious in light of the plain language 
of §§ 76-1-402 and 76-10-504 and also § 76-6-202. Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-
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504(3) provides "If the concealed firearm is used in commission of a violent felony... 
and the person is a party to the offense, the person is guilty of a second degree felony." 
There is no question that Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-103 is a lesser included 
offense of § 76-10-504(3). The real question is whether the legislature intended 
aggravated assault not to merge with concealed firearm charge under the facts of this 
case. Smith asserts that Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-202 sheds light on this case and 
clarifies the plain meaning of § 76-1-402. 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-202 is the statute prohibiting burglary, and provides: 
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building 
or any portion of a building with intent to commit: 
(a) a felony; 
(b) theft; 
(c) an assault on any person; 
(d) lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1); 
(e) sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3); 
(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702.5; or 
(g) voyeurism against a child under Subsection 76-9-702.7(2) or (5). 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a dwelling, 
in which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
(3) A violation of this section is a separate offense from any of the offenses listed 
in Subsections (l)(a) through (g), and which may be committed by the actor while 
he is in the building (emphasis added). 
Here the legislature outlines its intent to make sure that these acts are separate offenses to 
which merger does not apply. 
Conversely Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-504 does not include such language. 
Smith asserts, therefore, that had the legislature intended to make § 76-10-504 a separate 
offense to which merger does not apply, then the legislature would have included 
language similar to that contained in the burglary statute. On the other hand, Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-1-402(3) plainly provides that a defendant shall not be convicted of both 
the offense charged and the included offense. Smith asserts that the court of appeals' 
decision impermissibly nullifies § 76-1-402 and that the courts' conclusion that the two 
aggravated assault convictions in this case do not merge with second degree felony use of 
a concealed weapon is incorrect and should be reversed. 
H. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REMANDING THE 
CONCEALED WEAPON CHARGE FOR A NEW TRIAL 
At trial, jury instruction #13D expressly required the State to prove that Smith 
"[d]id not have a valid concealed firearm permit" (R. 718). The State presented no 
evidence in its case-in-chief that Smith did not have a concealed weapon permit and the 
court of appeals correctly concluded that Smith's trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to move for a directed verdict on this charge. Smith, 2003 UT App 52 at [^37. However, 
Smith asserts that the court of appeals incorrectly held that a new trial on this issue does 
not violate double jeopardy. Id. at ^ [37. 
The court of appeals erroneously concluded that remanding this issue for a new 
trial "does not violate the tenet of double jeopardy, because we reverse Smith's 
conviction for 'trial error' and not for insufficiency of the evidence." Smith, 2003 UT 
App 52 at ^35, n.8. Smith asserts that his trial counsel's performance was found 
deficient, not due to trial error, but because trial counsel failed to move for a directed 
verdict because of insufficient evidence. Accordingly, this conviction should be reversed 
with prejudice. 
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The court of appeals' reliance on State v. Lamorie, 610 P.2d 342 (Utah 1980) and 
State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545 (Utah 1996), is misplaced. In both cases, this Court 
reversed convictions and remanded for a new trial because of the trial courts' "erroneous 
introduction of evidence," not because the evidence was insufficient. Higginbotham, 917 
P.2d at 550. 
This Court in Higginbotham relied on Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 
2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), and stated: 
[T]he United States Supreme Court held that when a defendant's conviction is 
reversed by an appellate court on the sole ground that the evidence was 
insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a retrial 
on the same charge. 437 U.S. at 14, 98 S.Ct. at 2148. However, reversal for trial 
error does not constitute a decision to the effect that the government has failed to 
prove its case. As such, it implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of 
the defendant. Rather, it is a determination that a defendant has been convicted 
through a judicial process which is defective in some fundamental respect, e.g., 
incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence.... Id. at 15, 98 S.Ct. at 2149. 
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 551. 
The court of appeals' decision erodes the fundamental prohibition against being 
twice put in jeopardy. The United States Supreme Court has explained, 'The underlying 
idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, 
is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated 
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to 
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of 
anxiety and insecurity...." Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187, 78 S.Ct. 221, 223, 
2L.Ed.2dl99(1957). 
In this case, double jeopardy bars a new trial because the evidence presented at 
trial was insufficient to convict Smith. The court of appeals' reversal was not based on 
trial error, but rather on ineffective assistance of counsel due to insufficiency of the 
evidence. Allowing the State to prosecute Smith for the same charge, even though it 
failed to present sufficient evidence at the first trial, clearly violates double jeopardy and 
would expose Smith to the miscarriages of justice outlined in Green. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Smith respectfully asks this Court to affirm the court of 
appeals' decision that the evidence was insufficient to convict Smith for carrying a 
concealed weapon, but to reverse the court of appeals' decision that the case be remanded 
for a new trial and to reverse the decision that the two aggravated assault charges did not 
merge with the second degree felony use of a concealed weapon. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of February, 2004. 
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THORNE, Judge: 
Kl Norm Smith appeals from convictions for using a concealed 
weapon in the commission of a crime of violence, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504(3) (1995), and 
two counts of aggravated assault, both third degree felonies, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995), We affirm in part 
and reverse in part. 
BACKGROUND1 
%2 On the morning of April 9, 1996, Smith and his friend 
Clayton Call drove to Smith's property in Virgin, Utah. Once 
there, Smith suspected that someone had vandalized or stolen some 
1. H,On appeal, we recite the facts from the record in the light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict and-present conflicting 
evidence only as necessary to understand issues raised on 
appeal.'" State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66,^2, 52 P.3d 1210 (quoting 
State v. Daniels. 2002 UT 2,1(2, 40 P.3d 611), cert denied. 2003 
U.S. Lexis 935, 71 U.S.L.W. 3503 (U.S. Jan. 27, 2003). 
of his personal property. Both men left to look for Smith's 
missing property. Smith retrieved a holstered pistol from his 
residence and placed it around his waist. Smith then telephoned 
his wife and told her to report the suspected theft and 
vandalism. 
H3 Both men returned to the property, where Smith spoke to his 
^neighbors, Ron and Sharon Felton. Afterwards, for reasons not 
clear from the record, Smith began pacing up and down the 
property and throwing dirt clods at the Felton1s home, prompting 
Sharon Felton to call 911. 
K4 Eventually, Call left, but returned to warn Smith that two 
sheriff cars were heading toward the property. Shortly before 
Deputies Johnny Owen and Lorin Orvin arrived, Sharon Felton 
observed Smith pull his shirt down, covering the pistol. After 
the two deputies exited their vehicles, Deputy Owen advised Smith 
that they had received a complaint that he was brandishing a 
weapon. When Deputy Owen asked Smith if he had a weapon, Smith 
lifted up his shirt to expose his pistol and placed his hand on 
the butt oE the gun. Deputy Owen asked Smith to surrender the 
gun, but Smith refused'. 
1(5 Deputy Owen slowly moved toward Smith and repeatedly asked 
him to surrender the gun. Smith backed away, turned, ran, and 
hid in a partially-constructed building on the property. The 
deputies pursued him, positioning themselves outside two separate 
windows. 
1[6 Once in the building, Smith attempted to conceal himself 
behind several garbage cans. The deputies urged Smith to 
surrender his weapon. When Smith responded that he could shoot 
the deputies, Deputy Orvin told Smith that although he may very 
well shoot one of them, the other would shoot Smith before he 
could shoot them both. Smith then dropped to his knees and 
pointed his pistol directly at Deputy Orvin. Deputy Orvin took 
cover and radioed for assistance. 
H7 After several minutes of negotiation, Smith surrendered, and 
was arrested and charged with carrying a concealed dangerous 
weapon, two counts of aggravated assault, and interfering with a 
lawful arrest. A jury convicted Smith on each count. The trial 
court suspended prison terms of one to fifteen years on the 
second-degree felony and zero to five years on each aggravated 
assault charge. The court also sentenced Smith to serve 60 days 
in the county jail, pay $2,000 in fines, $300 in costs, and serve 
3 6 months probation. Smith now appeals. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
18 Smith first argues -that he was denied his Sixth Amendment 
right to call witnesses and to confront the witnesses against 
him. When reviewing a trial court's decision not to allow a 
defendant to call a witness or to limit the cross-examination of 
a witness, we "review the legal rule applied for correctness and 
the application of the rule to the facts of the case for an abuse 
of discretion." State v. Chavez, 2002 UT App 9,1(17, 41 P.3d 
1137. 
19 Smith next argues that the trial court erred by refusing to 
merge the aggravated assault charges with the concealed weapon 
charge. "Merger issues present questions of law, which we review 
for correctness." State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288,110, 55 P.3d 
1131, cert denied, 2003 Utah Lexis 4 (Utah Jan. 13, 2003). 
1lQ Smith next argues that the evidence was insufficient to 
support his conviction for carrying a concealed weapon in the 
second degree. "In considering an insufficiency-of-evidence 
claim, we review the evidence and all reasonable inferences that 
may be drawn from it in a light most favorable to the verdict." 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993). 
111 Smith also argues that the trial court committed plain error 
in failing to instruct the jury that threatening with a dangerous 
weapon is a lesser included offense of aggravated assault. To 
establish plain error, Smith must show that: "(i) an error was 
made; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; 
and (iii) the error was harmful, so that in the absence of the 
error, a more favorable outcome was reasonably likely " State v. 
Helmick, 2000 UT 70,19, 9 P.3d 164. 
112 Finally, Smith argues that his trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance. We review this claim as a matter of law: 
See State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32,120, 984 P.2d 37S. 
ANALYSIS 
1. Right to Call and Confront Witnesses 
1l3 Smith first asserts that he was denied his Sixth Amendment 
right to call a witness when the trial court denied his request 
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to call Ron Felton.2 To establish a violation of his 
constitutional right to .call a witness, "a criminal defendant 
. . . must make some possible showing that the testimony of the 
absent witness 'would have been both material and favorable to 
his defense.1" State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 274 (Utah 1985) 
(quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bernalr 458 U.S. 858, 873, 
102 S. Ct. 3440, 3449 (1982)). "Testimony is material, and its 
exclusion therefore prejudicial, if there is a reasonable 
probability that its presence would affect the outcome of the 
trial." Id. at 275. 
1l4 Here, Smith asked to call Ron Felton as a witness. Smith 
had spoken with Ron Felton several hours before the deputies 
arrived and Smith alleged that Ron Felton would have testified 
that Smith had been calm during that conversation. Smith argued 
that Ron Felton's testimony was necessary to rebut testimony that 
he was agitated and excited when the deputies first arrived at 
the property. The trial court excluded Ron Felton's testimony 
because it found the testimony to be too attenuated from the 
encounter with the deputies to be relevant or material. 
fl5 Smith's demeanor hours before the deputies arrived has no 
bearing on whether he, in fact, carried a concealed weapon, 
assaulted the deputies, or interfered with a lawful arrest hours 
later. Furthermore, Smith's own witness, Call, testified that 
immediately before and during the incident, Smith was angry and 
agitated. Smith also acknowledged, in his own testimony, that he 
was "irritated" with the sheriff's office and its deputies. In 
light of the testimony of both Smith and Call, and the 
intervening time lapse, it is extremely unlikely that Ron 
Felton's testimony would have affected the outcome of the trial. 
Thus, the testimony was not sufficiently relevant or material and 
the trial court did not violate Smith's Sixth Amendment rights 
when it excluded the testimony. 
1l6 Smith next argues that the trial court violated his Sixth 
Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him when the 
trial court limited his cross-examination of Deputy Orvin. This 
court has held that trial judges may impose reasonable limits on 
2. At trial, Smith sought to call Ron Felton to rebut Deputy 
Owen's testimony that Smith had been agitated during his 
encounter with the deputies. The trial court found the evidence 
too attenuated to be relevant and denied Smith's request. In 
contrast, on appeal Smith argues that Ron Felton's testimony was 
relevant to rebut Sharon Felton's testimony. However, Smith did 
not renew his request to call Ron Felton after Sharon Felton 
testified and does not argue plain error on appeal. Thus, we 
review only the trial court's ruling that Ron Felton's testimony 
was too attenuated to be relevant. 
o on n -3 a _ H A 4 
cross-examination if interrogation is Mlrepetitive or only 
marginally relevant.'" Chavez, 2002 UT App 9 at fl9 (quoting 
Delaware v. Van Arsdall,-475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1435 
(1986)). 
Hl7 It is within the trial court's permitted range of discretion 
to limit cross-examination on matters which are either marginally 
relevant or pointlessly repetitive. See id^ Here, prior to 
cross-examination, Deputy Orvin testified for approximately 
thirty-fourvminutes over"the course of two days. Smith then 
cross-examined him for approximately fifty minutes before the 
trial court ordered a recess. During that recess; the court 
advised Smith that he was imposing a thirty-minute time limit on 
the remainder of Smith's cross-examination because the Gourt 
believed that Smith was "straying off into the minutiae." After 
thirty minutes of additional cross-examination, the court 
informed Smith that he had reached his time limit. However, upon 
Smith's request, the court allowed him to continue asking 
questions regarding his surrender. When it became obvious that 
the cross-examination was no longer relevant, the trial court 
directed Smith to stop. 
i|l8 Thus, Smith was given over eighty minutes to cross-examine 
Deputy Orvin. Smith chose to use this time to question Deputy 
Orvin about such things as the location of the deputies1 cars, 
the type of animals on the property, the characteristics of the 
fence, and other matters irrelevant to the proceedings. A 
defendant is not entitled to an unlimited or pointless 
examination of witnesses. See generally id. After reviewing the 
record, we conclude that<the trial court's limitation did not 
prevent Smith from eliciting testimony necessary to his defense. 
The trial court simply restricted Smith from questioning the 
witness about matters which were only marginally relevant or that 
were pointlessly repetitive of earlier testimony. Thus, Smith 
was given an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Deputy Orvin 
and his Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness against him 
was not violated. 
II. Merger of Lesser Included Offense 
fl9 Smith next argues that aggravated assault is a lesser 
included offense of second-degree use of a concealed weapon and 
t^he trial court erred by refusing to merge the two crimes.3 
"Merger is a judicially-crafted doctrine available to protect 
criminal defendants from being twice punished for committing a 
single act that may violate more than one criminal statute." 
State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288,1(17, 55 P.3d 1131. This principle 
3. Smith preserved this issue by raising it in a pretrial 
motion. 
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has been codified at Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (1999), which 
provides that " [a] defendant may be convicted of an offense 
included in the offense charged but may not be convicted of both 
the offense charged and the included offense." 
f20 Here, to convict Smith of carrying a concealed weapon in the 
second-degree, the State had to prove that Smith used a concealed 
weapon in the commission of a "crime of violence," in this case 
aggravated assault. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504(3) (1995). 
Accordingly, to convict Smith of a second degree felony the State 
had to prove each and every element of aggravated assault plus 
the elements of the weapon charge. Consequently, the third-
degree aggravated assault was "established by proof of the same 
or less than all of the facts required to establish" the second-
degree weapons offense. Utah Code Ann § 76-1-402(3)(a). 
Pursuant to a traditional merger analysis, the underlying 
aggravated assault charges should merge into the second-degree 
felony. S£e, e.g.. State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10,1116, 994 P.2d 
1243 (noting "the inquiry of whether one crime is a lesser 
included offense of a greater crime under section 76-1-402, [and 
merges therein] turns on the statutorily defined elements of the 
two crimes") * 
1|21 To counter Smith1 s contention that the crimes should merge, 
the State relies upon the reasoning found in State v. McCovey, 
803 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1990). In McCovey, the Utah Supreme Court 
concluded that an underlying felony did not merge into a felony 
murder charge. See id. at 123 9. Central to the court's 
conclusion was its determination that the felony murder statute 
was an enhancement statute. See id. at 123 8-3 9. The court 
stated that "enhancement statutes are different in nature than 
other criminal statutes." Id. at 123 7. By creating an 
enhancement statute the legislature communicated its intent that 
underlying crimes not merge with the specific enhanced crime. 
See generally id. at 1239; see also State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 
99,163, 37 P.3d 1073 (noting the court in McCovev "explicitly 
premised [its] holding [not to merge] on the legislature's 
intent"). 
122 After considering Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 in light of 
McCovey, we agree with the State and conclude that it is most 
properly characterized as an enhancement statute to which~the 
legislature did not intend merger to apply. The legislature 
determined that " [i]f the concealed firearm is used in the 
commission of a crime of violence as defined in [s]ection 
76-1-501, and the person is a party to the offense" then the 
concealed weapon offense is enhanced to a second degree felony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504(3). The penalties imposed by section 
76-10-504 increase proportionally to the increased risk to the 
public, and this graduated punishment scale is indicative of an 
enhancement statute. Moreover, " [i]t is the prerogative of the 
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legislature to prescribe the punishment for crimes. Included 
therein is the authority to increase the degree of crime, where 
instruments of violence,-* such as explosives or firearms are 
used." State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992, 994-95 (Utah 1978) (footnote 
omitted). 
[^23 We conclude that the legislature intended section 76-10-504 
to act as an enhancement statute and thereby communicated its 
intent that the underlying violent crime remain separate from the 
concealed weapon charge. Thus, we conclude that Smith's claim 
that his aggravated assault charges should have merged with the 
concealed weapon charge is without merit. 
III. Insufficiency of the Evidence 
1|24 Smith claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain 
the jury's verdict that he used a concealed firearm in the 
commission of a crime of violence.4 Smith asserts that the State 
failed to meet its burden of proof in showing that he "knowingly 
and intentionally" concealed the firearm. However, section 76-
10-504(3) does not specify a culpable mental state. Thus, 
contrary to Smith's argument, the State was not required to prove 
intent or knowledge; rather, if the evidence was sufficient to 
show that ^Smith's conduct was reckless, the State has met its 
burden. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1999) (noting when an 
offense is not a strict liability offense and does not specify a 
culpable mental state, "intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall 
suffice to establish criminal responsibility"). 
f25 Here, the State presented evidence that Smith picked up a 
holstered pistol at his residence and put it around his waist. 
The State also presented evidence that just before the deputies 
arrived at the property, Smith untucked his shirt so that it 
obscured the pistol from view, The deputies testified that upon 
arriving at the property, they did not see the pistol and had to 
question Smith about its existence. Upon admitting that he had a 
pistol^ Smith had to raise his shirt to reveal it. This is 
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could have 
determined that Smith recklessly or intentionally concealed the 
pistol. 
4. Smith later argues that his trial counsel was ineffective 
because he failed to request a directed verdict on his concealed 
weapon charge when the State presented no evidence that Smith did 
not have a permit to carry a concealed weapon. Smith, however, 
does not argue this as a basis for finding the evidence 
insufficient, for during his defense he testified that he did not 
possess such a permit. Consequently, we reserve our discussion 
of the State's failure to present such evidence during its case-
In- chief to Smith's ineffectiveness argument. 
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H26 Smith also claims the evidence was insufficient to establish 
that he used ci concealed firearm in the commission of a crime of 
violence because the pistol became unconcealed during the 
aggravated assault. The plain language of the statute does not 
require that the commission of the crime be contemporaneous with 
the concealment of the weapon. Nor does Smith present case law, 
either from Utah or elsewhere, to support such a proposition. 
Thus, we concLude that the trial court did not commit error in 
refusing to set aside the verdict on this basis. 
IV. Plain Error 
H27 Smith next claims that the trial court committed plain error 
in failing to instruct the jury that threatening with a dangerous 
weapon, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506, is a lesser 
included offense of aggravated assault. To establish plain 
error, Smith must show that "(i) an error was made; (ii) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the 
error //as harmful, so that in the absence of the error, a more 
favorable outcome was reasonably likely." Helmick, 2000 UT 70 at 
19. * 
f28 Smith relies on State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551 (Utah 1984), 
to support his claim of plain error. In Oldroyd, the Utah 
Supreme Court; held that the defendant' s use of a weapon could 
have constituted either aggravated assault or threatening with a 
dangerous weapon and that the failure of the trial court to 
instruct the jury on this lesser included offense, after the 
defendant revested such an instruction, was reversible error. 
See id. at 554-56. 
1(29 Smith1 s reliance upon Oldroyd is misplaced. In Oldroyd, the 
defendant requested the trial court to instruct the jury on the 
crime of threatening with a dangerous weapon because the evidence 
at trial supported such an instruction- See id at 553. In 
contrast, Smith never requested such an instruction and 
maintained his innocence throughout the trial. Smith1s defense 
was that he was unable to comply with the deputies1 request to 
surrender his weapon because he received conflicting instructions 
as to how to surrender the weapon. 
130 In light of a claim of total innocence, it was not plain 
error for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury on the 
lesser included crime of threatening with a dangerous weapon when 
there was no request to do so by either party. " [A] n accused may 
choose not to request instructions on lesser included offenses as 
a matter of trial strategy, usually in the belief that he can 
defeat the greater charge, but might not*be able to defeat a 
lesser included offense.11 State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 94 (Utah 
1982) . Smith and his trial counsel could have made a reasonable 
strategic decision not to instruct the jury on the crime of 
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threatening with a dangerous weapon out of fear that the jury 
might convict Smith of that crime if it was not able to agree 
that he was guilty of aggravated assault.5 Thus, the trial court 
did not err in failing to give this instruction. 
V. Ineffective-Assistance of Counsel6 
131 Smith claims that his counsel was ineffective because he did 
not request a dismissal of the concealed weapon charge after the 
State failed to introduce evidence in its case-in-chief that 
Smith did not have a concealed weapon permit. "To show 
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) that 
counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an 
objective standard of reasonableness [,] and (2) that but for 
counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability 
that the outcome of the trial would have been different," ~ 
Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT 72,1l9, 61 P.3d 978 (quotations and 
citations omitted). 
5. Smith also raises the failure to request an instruction on a 
lesser included offense as grounds for finding his trial counsel 
ineffective. However, when omitting an instruction appears to be 
a matter of trial strategy, it will not be a basis for finding 
trial counsel ineffective. Cf. State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 
635-36 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (noting an ineffectiveness claim 
failed because defendant could not disprove that omission of the 
jury instruction was a "conscious trial strategy"). 
6. While Smith was represented by counsel at his trial, he took 
a very active role in his own representation. For example, the 
trial court allowed Smith to conduct direct and cross-
examinations of witnesses and to present argument to the court. 
The trial court's decision to allow Smith to have counsel and yet 
appear to represent himself (on several occasions throughout the 
proceedings, Smith claimed he was acting either as co-counsel or 
pro se) is in conflict with our jurisprudence. See State v. 
Bakalov, 1999 UT 45,115, 979 P.2d 799 (noting that the right to 
represent oneself and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel are 
"rriutually exclusive rights"). After reviewing the record, we 
conclude that Smith's active participation in his own defense 
frustrated the judicial process. See id. at 1l7 (noting that 
"[a] criminal defendant may be asked, in the interest of orderly 
procedures, to choose between waiver [of counsel] and another 
course of action"(quotations and citations omitted)(second 
alteration in original)). We strongly caution trial courts from 
allowing defendants to represent themselves and have counsel, for 
it creates a situation where a defendant may both represent 
himself at trial and argue ineffective assistance of counsel on 
appeal. 
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H3 2 Pursuant to both section 76-10-504(1) (b)7 and jury 
instruction #13D, the State was required to prove that Smith did 
not have a valid permit :to carry a concealed weapon. However, in 
its case-in-chief, the State presented no evidence that Smith 
lacked such a permit. The State's failure to present evidence to 
satisfy this necessary element of the offense would have entitled 
Smith to a dismissal on that count. See, e.g., State v. 
Kihlstrom. 1999 UT App 289,18, 988 P.2d 949, cert denied. 4 P.3d 
1289 ("If the prosecution has failed to present sufficient 
evidence to support its case, the trial court should dismiss."). 
133 Trial counsel's failure to argue this lack of evidence after 
the State rested does not appear to have served a tactical 
purpose at trial; nor has the State offered a possible tactical 
purpose on appeal. "When no possible explanation or tactical 
reason exists for such a decision, we have held that the first 
part of the [ineffective assistance of counsel] test is 
satisfied." Finlavson, 2000 UT 10,^24 (citation omitted). We 
conclude that trial counsel's failure to raise this lack of 
evidence as a basis for dismissal of the charge is "so deficient 
as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.11 
Wickham, 2002 UT 72 at 1l9. 
K34 Moreover, we conclude that "but for counsel's deficient 
performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of 
the trial would have been different." Id. (quotation and 
citation omitted). Had trial counsel raised this lack of 
evidence, there is a reasonable probability that the trial court 
would have dismissed the concealed weapon charge. Cf. Kihlstrom, 
1999 UT App 289 at 18. 
c35 The State argues that even had Smith's counsel moved for a 
directed verdict based on a lack of evidence, the State could 
have "properly and with little difficulty . . . moved to reopen 
and supply the missing evidence." State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 
7. Section 76-10-504 provides 
[A] person without a valid concealed firearm 
permit who carries a concealed dangerous 
weapon which is a firearm and that contains 
no ammunition is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor, but if the firearm contains 
ammunition the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
If the concealed firearm is used in the 
commission of a crime of violence . . - and 
the person is a party to the offense, the 
person is guilty of a second degree felony. 
Utah Code Ann § 76-10-504(1) (b) , (3) (1999). 
10 
323, 234 P.2d 600, 601 (1951). We are unconvinced. A trial 
court has discretionary authority to determine whether to reopen 
a case to admit additional evidence. See State v. Duncan, 102 
Utah 449, 132 P.2d 121, 125 '(1942). Here, where the State 
obviously failed to introduce a necessary element of the crime, 
we are not convinced that the trial court would have necessarily 
allowed the State to reopen its case and supply the missing 
evidence- Accordingly, because of trial counsel's ineffective 
assistance related to this single charge, we reverse Smith's 
conviction for second-degree concealment of a dangerous weapon 
and remand for a new trial on that count.8 
8. Remanding for a new trial on this count does not violate the 
tenets of double jeopardy, because we reverse Smith's conviction 
for "trial error" and not for insufficiency of the evidence. 
"[R]eversal for trial error, as distinguished 
from evidentiary insufficiency, does not 
constitute a decision to the effect that: the 
government has failed to prove its case. As 
such, it implies nothing with respect to the 
guilt or innocence of the defendant. Rather, 
it is a determination that a defendant has 
been convicted through a judicial process 
which is defective in some fundamental 
respect." 
State v. Lamorie, 610 P.2d 342, 347 (Utah 1980) (alterations in 
original) (quoting Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15, 98 S. 
Ct. 2141, 2149 (1978)) . 
In State v. Hicrainbotham, 917 P.2d 545 (Utah 1996), the Utah 
Supreme Court excluded all evidence erroneously admitted at 
trial, see id. at 550, and concluded that without the evidence, 
the state had failed to prove "an essential element of the 
charge." Id. The court then reversed and remanded for a new 
trial on that count. See id. at 551. Relying upon Lamorie, 610 
P.2d at 347, the court stated: 
The court in Lamorie held, as we do here, 
that the prosecution failed to prove an 
essential element of the charge. The court 
remanded for a new trial after reversing the 
conviction, holding that doing so does not 
place the accused in double jeopardy because 
the error giving rise to the reversal, i.e., 
the trial courtfs erroneous introduction of 
evidence, was "trial error" as distinguished 
from insufficiency of the evidence. 
iigginbotham, 917 P.2d at 550 (citations omitted). 
Here, the basis for our reversal is -that Smith was deprived 
Df his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, 
i determination that implies nothing regarding Smith's guilt or 
tnnocence. Rather, our conclusion that Smith's trial counsel was 
(continued...) 
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CONCLUSION 
136 The trial court did: not deny Smith his Sixth Amendment right 
to call witnesses, or to confront witnesses against him. The 
evidence was sufficient to convict Smith for aggravated assault, 
carrying a concealed weapon in the second degree, and resisting a 
lawful arrest. The trial court properly denied Smith1s request 
to, merge the aggravated assault charges into the second-degree 
concealed weapon charge. It was not error for the trial court to 
fail to instruct on a lesser included offense nor was trial 
counsel ineffective for not demanding such an instruction. 
i|37 However, we conclude that Smith's trial counsel was 
ineffective in failing to move for a directed verdict after the 
State failed to present evidence that Smith did not possess a 
valid concealed weapon permit during its case in chief. 
Accordingly, we affirm Smith's convictions for aggravated assault 
and resisting a lawful arrest, but reverse and remand Smith's 
conviction for carrying a concealed dangerous weapon for a new 
trial. 
William A. Thorne Jr 
138 WE CONCUR: 
Jud i th M. B i l l i ngs , 
Associate Presiding Judge 
JJ*r£gory K. Orine, Judge 
8. (...continued) 
ineffective speaks to an "error in the trial process and . . . 
not an error in judgment concerning the quantum of evidence 
needed to convict and sentence." See flfrate v. Palmer. 600 N.W.2d 
756, 780 (Neb. 1999} (Connolly, J., concurring), cert d^m'^
 528 
U.S. 1192, 120 S, Ct. 1248 (2000). Thus, the error giving rise 
to the reversal in this case is trial error and remanding for a 
new trial does not violate double jeopardy. 
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OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON 76-5-103 
History: C. 1953,76-5-102.8, enacted by L. became effective on May 3, 1999, pursuant to 
1999, ch. 274, § 1. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective-Dates. — Laws 1999, ch. 274 
76-5-103, Aggravated assault. 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection 
(l)(a), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other 
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony. 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-103, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-103; 1974, ch. 32, § 10; 
1989, ch. 170, § 2; 1995, ch. 291, § 5. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 1995, added "under 
circumstances not amounting to a violation of 
Subsection QXa)" to the beginning of Subsec-
ANALYSIS 
Dangerous weapon. 
Defense of habitation. 
Evidence. 
—Sufficient. 
Included offense. 
Indictment or information. 
Instructions. 
—Citizen's arrest. 
—Flight. 
—Vicarious liability. 
Jury question. 
Object of threat. 
—Victim. 
Recklessness. 
Self-defense. 
Serious bodily injury. 
Threatening with dangerous weapon distin-
guished. 
Voluntary intoxication. 
Cited. 
Dangerous weapon. 
Under former statute which described as-
sault with deadly weapon, character of weapon 
could be inferred from wounds or other indicia, 
*ven though name or precise character of the 
^instrument could not be proven. State v. 
Jukanovich, 45 Utah 372, 146 P. 289 (1915). 
A razor could be a deadly weapon under 
former statute describing assault with a deadly 
-weapon. State v. Anselmo, 46 Utah 137, 148 P. 
;1071 (1915). 
Instructing jury that fist could under certain 
tion (lXb); substituted "A violation of Subsec-
tion (lXa)" for "Aggravated assault" and "sec-
ond degree" for "third degree" in Subsection (2); 
and added Subsection (3). 
Cross-References. — Attempt, § 76-4-101. 
Possession of a dangerous weapon with in-
tent to assault, § 76-10-507. 
circumstances become deadly or dangerous 
weapon was prejudicial error as it might have 
directed minds of jury away from crucial issue 
as to whether defendant used razor blade as a 
deadly weapon. State v. Ireland, 22 Utah 2d 17, 
447 P.2d 375 (1968). 
Defense of habitation. 
Defendant's appearances at his estranged 
wife's apartment to visit his children gave him 
no proprietary right or justification to consider 
or treat the apartment as his own "habitation," 
and his aggravated assault on his wife's over-
night male companion was therefore not justi-
fied by § 76-2-405. State v. McKenna, 728 P.2d 
984 (Utah 1986). 
Evidence. 
In a prosecution for aggravated assault, the 
trial court's admission of a knife, similar to the 
one used in the assault, and a ruler, illustrative 
of the testimony of a witness and indicative of 
the actual length of the weapon, was not un-
duly prejudicial. State v. Royball, 710 P.2d 168 
(Utah 1985). 
—Sufficient. 
Evidence indicating that defendant had 
threatened his former wife and her father with 
loaded sawed-off shotgun was sufficient, if be-
lieved by jury, to support conviction of defen-
dant for assault with deadly weapon. State v, 
Dunnivan, 26 Utah 2d 147,486 R2d 393 (1971). 
The defendant's conduct in pulling a loaded 
.38 caliber revolver from his waistband and 
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OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY 76-10-501 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
i Law Review. — The Individual Right 
t Arms. An Illusory Public Pacifier9,1986 
Kev 751 
10-501. Definitions. 
jsed m this part: 
(1) (a) "Concealed dangerous weapon" means a dangerous weapon that 
is covered, hidden, or secreted in a manner that the public would not 
be aware of its presence and is readily accessible for immediate use. 
(b) A dangerous weapon shall not be considered a concealed dan-
gerous weapon if it is a firearm which is unloaded and is securely 
encased. 
|v (2) "Crime of violence" means aggravated murder, murder, manslaugh-
&r, rape, mayhem, kidnapping, robbery, burglary, housebreaking, extor-
tm, or blackmail accompanied by threats of violence, assault with a 
ngerous weapon, assault with intent to commit any offense punishable 
imprisonment for more than one year, arson punishable by imprison-
ent for more than one year, or an attempt to commit any of these 
lenses. 
U<}) "Criminal history background check" means a criminal background 
&eck conducted by a licensed firearms dealer on every purchaser of a 
idgun through the division or the local law enforcement agency where 
\\v firearms dealer conducts business. 
14) (a) "Dangerous weapon" means any item that in the manner of its 
use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily 
injury. The following factors shall be used in determining whether a 
knife, or any other item, object, or thing not commonly known as a 
dangerous weapon is a dangerous weapon: 
(i) the character of the instrument, object, or thing; 
(ii) the character of the wound produced, if any; 
(iii) the manner in which the instrument, object, or thing was 
used; and 
(iv) the other lawful purposes for which the instrument, object, 
or thing may be used. 
(b) "Dangerous weapon" does not include any explosive, chemical, 
or incendiary device as defined by Section 76-10-306. 
(6) "Dealer" means every person who is licensed under crimes and 
nnal procedure, 18 U.S.C. 923 and engaged in the business of selling, 
ftfiing, or otherwise transferring a handgun, whether the person is a 
iii or wholesale dealer, pawnbroker, or otherwise. 
M6) "Division" means the Criminal Investigations and Technical Ser-
f»6 Division of the Department of Public Safety, created in Section 
•10-103. 
17) "Enter" means intrusion of the entire body. 
4fl) "Firearm" means a pistol, revolver, shotgun, sawed-ofF shotgun, rifle 
r-*awed-off rifle, or any device that could be used as a dangerous weapon 
Dm which is expelled a projectile by action of an explosive. 
r(0) "Firearms transaction record form" means a form created by the 
mion to be completed by a person purchasing, selling, or transferring a 
indgun from a dealer in the state. 
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OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY 76-10-504 
gigte statute making it illegal for felon to have 
Saiession or control of firearm or other dan-
J^us weapon, 66 A.L.R.4th 1240 
76-10-504. Carrying concealed dangerous weapon — Pen-
alties. 
(1) Except as provided in Section 76-10-503 and in Subsections (2) and (3): 
(a) a person who carries a concealed dangerous weapon, as defined in 
Section 76-10-501, which is not a firearm on his person or one that is 
readily accessible for immediate use which is not securely encased, as 
defined in this part, in a place other than his residence, property, or 
business under his control is guilty of a class B misdemeanor; and 
(b) a person without a valid concealed firearm permit who carries a 
concealed dangerous weapon which is a firearm and that contains no 
ammunition is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, but if the firearm contains 
ammunition the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(2) A person who carries concealed a sawed-off shotgun or a sawed-off rifle 
is guilty of a second degree felony. 
<3) If the concealed firearm is used in the commission of a crime of violence 
as defined in Section 76-10-501, and the person is a party to the offense, the 
person is guilty of a second degree felony. 
(4) Nothing in Subsection (1) shall prohibit a person engaged in the lawful 
taking of protected or unprotected wildlife as defined in Title 23, Fish and 
Game, from carrying a concealed weapon or a concealed firearm with a barrel 
:
 length of four inches or greater as long as the taking of wildlife does not occur: 
(a) within the limits of a municipality in violation of that municipality's 
ordinances; or 
(b) upon the highways of the state as defined in Section 41-6-1. 
History: C. 1953,76-10-504, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
cn. 80, § 2; 1997, ch. 289, § 13. ment, effective May 5, 1997, added a reference 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws to § 76-10-501 in Subsection (lXa); added "Fish 
1995,ch.80,§ 2 repeals former § 76-10-504, as and Game" after Title 23" in Subsection (4); 
•acted by Laws 1982, ch. 17, § 1, relating to and made grammatical changes, 
t^nying concealed dangerous weapons, and 
^Sacts the present section, effective May 1, 
-1905. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS vehicle, § 76-10-505, is not a necessarily in-
Tfcrrying." eluded offense of carrying a concealed danger-
l*»er included offenses o u s weapon. State v. Williams, 636 P.2d 1092 
n W i n i r - (Utah 1981). 
jirZ}*1^' ,, . , , , The crime of carrying a concealed dangerous 
^ P w o n will be deemed to be "carrying a
 w e a p o n ^ a l e g s e r m c i u d e d o f f e n f l e o f awmd. ^ w e a p o n if the weapon is: shown to be d fel retail < h e f t w h e n ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Senate lZSTnS T **d™*f ** »> is made a felony by the actor's being armed 
w t ^ S l Z V aCCeS"; " ^ K™^ with a deadly weapon in the courst of the 
» W ^ T ^ U P ° ^ ° n e S P ^ * ? m a t l - crime. State v. Kinsey, 797 P.2d 424 (Utah Ct. 
wrying7 within the meaning of this sec-
 A loom 
: State v. Williams, 636 P.2d 1092 (Utah T j *.i' * ^ J J „t_- ^ r 
1). ^ < ^ a , «ou X.*KI AW* vwum
 A defendant convicted under this section for 
fej^~ . firing a pistol from a moving vehicle into an-
^JJJ*r included offenses. other moving vehicle was not entitled to a jury 
offense of carrying a loaded firearm in a instruction on the lesser included offense of 
4 4 1 
INSTRUCTION NO 15 Q 
Before you can find the defendant guilty of the crime of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous 
Weapon, as charged in Count I of the Information, you must find from the evidence, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of that crime 
1. That the defendant, Norm Smith, 
2. On or about April 9, 1996 (although the exact date is immaterial), 
3. In Washington County, State of Utah, 
4. Did carry a concealed dangerous weapon which was a firearm, 
5. Did not have a valid concealed firearm permit, and 
6. Did use the concealed firearm in the commission of a crime of violence. 
If you find that the evidence establishes each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, 
it is your duty to find the defendant guilty. If you find that the evidence fails to establish one or more 
of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to find the defendant not guilty. 
